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1. Introduction 
 
The problem discussed in this paper emerges from work I’ve 
done on the modern ideal of autonomy.1 I found that autonomy is often 
seen as a morally neutral term. Put in terms of good and evil, this means 
that it is held consistent to say that a person is autonomous and chooses 
evil. Autonomy, by itself, so it is argued, is neutral with regard to good or 
evil. On this view, whether or not I choose evil, if I make this choice in the 
capacity of being my own master, of governing and ruling myself, then 
there is nothing in the way of autonomy that I lack. For example, Feinberg 
argues that autonomy is consistent with ruthlessness, cruelty, and other 
(moral) failings, and that it is therefore at best only a partial ideal 
“insufficient for full moral excellence.”2  
Is this a tenable position? In this paper I discuss whether it makes 
sense to say that a person has a (real) choice between good and evil, 
regardless of his state in terms of autonomy. First, I clarify the problem by 
using aspects from the work of Plato and Augustine. Second, I show how 
Kant attempts to deal with this problem by discussing key aspects of his 
moral theory, in particular his concept of radical evil.  
For the sake of my argument, I assume in this paper that it is 
meaningful to speak of ‘good’ and ‘evil’.  
 
2. Plato and Augustine 
 
The dominant contemporary view that we are free to choose evil 
can be challenged by looking at Plato’s ideal of the person. This ideal is, 
briefly put, to have vision of the Good and reach the Good. On the basis of 
my reading of the Phaedrus and Book VII of the Republic, it seems that 
this ideal does not allow for any choice between good and evil. Either we 
know the Good, and then we have no choice, since it is inconceivable for 
us to want anything else than the Good; or we don’t know the Good, and 
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then we don’t really have an idea of good and evil anyway. Of course, it is 
possible to turn away from the Good, but, so it seems, this is not an option 
once I really know the Good. Once I liberated myself, or once I am 
liberated, being no longer chained in the cave and having to look at the 
shadows of the Good, once I’ve seen the Good itself, it seems that I have 
no reason to want evil. However, ‘reason’ is perhaps not the best term 
here. If I’ve seen the Good, I enjoy what Plato calls ‘madness’. This 
madness is not the madness ascribed to me by others who have not seen 
the Good, when I return to the cave. Rather, I have in mind here the 
madness Plato ascribes to the “lover of the Beautiful”3, which, by analogy, 
can be ascribed to whom we could call the lover of the Good. Since both 
the Beautiful and the Good are Ideas, I believe this analogy is justified. 
Therefore, I infer that once we’ve seen the Good, or once we’ve 
recollected the Good from a former life, as Plato understood it, we are 
unable to make any choice with regard to good and evil, since we are 
already lovers of the Good. This kind of madness is, according to Plato, a 
divine gift, and different from madness that is evil.4 Once this madness has 
been given to us, then, we are unable ever to choose evil. 
But are we not free to turn away from the Good? Consider 
Augustine’s position. He, too, has a notion of ‘divine gift’, namely his 
concept of grace, and an account of turning towards the one or away from 
the one, which Augustine calls God. The general influence of Platonic 
thought on Christianity in general, and Augustine in particular, is well-
known. However, there is a major difference between Plato and Augustine 
on the issue on choosing evil, and this difference is not the terms ‘grace’ 
or ‘God’, but a fundamentally different view of the extent of freedom we 
have. According to Augustine, we do have a choice between good and 
evil, since God gave us a free will. In On Free Choice of the Will 
Augustine asserts that “all good proceeds from God”,5 but that we can 
choose evil, and that it is our responsibility if we do so. In the Confessions 
Augustine claims that “we do evil because we do so of our own free 
will...”6 Augustine then inquires into the grounds for doing evil. He asks: 
If I do evil because of my free will, “how, then, do I come to possess a 
will that can choose to do wrong and refuse to do good...? Who put this 
will into me? Who sowed this seed of bitterness in me...?”7 He blames the 
devil for doing that, but realizes that this is no answer to the question, 
since we still wonder why the devil got wicked. Augustine writes: “How 
did he come to possess the wicked will which made him a devil, when the 
Creator, who is entirely good, made him a good angel and nothing else?”8
341 
Mark Coeckelbergh 
 
 
In spite of this problem, not finding a ground for evil, Augustine 
maintains that we are free to turn away from God and Good. The capacity 
of free will is given to us, and we can choose what to do with it. But if we 
choose evil, “God the Creator is not at fault.”9 To summarize, Augustine 
wants to maintain that the freedom of the will includes the freedom to 
choose between good and evil. The problem with this view, however, is 
that he can’t find a ground for choosing evil. He is unable to give a good 
reason why we have a real choice between good and evil.  
Note that this problem can be solved by assuming that there is, 
instead of one good God, a good and an evil principle in the world and in 
ourselves, light and darkness. Then there is no problem regarding the 
grounds for choosing evil, since if I am merely a part of the stage on 
which the cosmic battle between good and evil features, I have no choice. 
But this route Augustine closed. First he was a convert to the Manichean 
religion, holding such beliefs. But, as we learn from the Confessions, 
having been influenced by Neo-Platonism, he argues against his former 
religion, rejecting the dualism and determinism of the Manicheans. He 
denies that there is an evil principle that stands on the same footing as, that 
can claim as much reality as, the good (God). Furthermore, he believes 
that human beings are not determined by outer forces, but that they have a 
free will and that they can exercise this free will to choose between good 
and evil.  
I suggest that it is precisely his belief in the freedom to choose 
between good and evil that led Augustine to consider grace, since he must 
have realized that if there is no ground for choosing evil, there is also - at 
first sight - no ground for choosing good. God’s grace, then, can awaken 
our souls to the love of the Good; grace provides a ground for choosing 
good. But then Augustine has the problem that he has to marry his view 
that we have free will and that this freedom extends to the choice between 
good and evil, on the one hand, with the view that we cannot choose the 
Good but that the Good is something that happens to us as a gift from 
God, on the other hand. If we are dependent on God in this way, are we 
still free? Moreover, again Augustine’s view shows to be very 
asymmetric: the Good happens to me, but evil is my own fault. In any 
case, whatever the further problems with this view, with regard to the 
issue of choosing evil it is clear that if we consider Augustine’s view as 
including the concept of grace, there is still the problem that - although 
there may be a ground for choosing the good - there is no ground for 
choosing evil. I’m still ‘free’ to choose evil, but it’s not clear on what 
basis I can make this choice. 
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Note that neither the doctrine of original sin nor Augustine’s 
view that there is a part in the soul that is drawn to goodness solves the 
problem. It is plain that there being ‘original sin’ does not prevent people 
from choosing good, and that there being a part of the soul that is drawn to 
goodness does not prevent people from choosing evil. It seems to me that 
Augustine wants to maintain the idea that we have the freedom to choose 
between good and evil, whatever our ‘human nature’ may be. 
 
3. A problem of authority and obedience 
 
The problem discussed so far can be put in terms of the authority 
of the good. If I know and acknowledge the good and/or God as having 
moral authority over me, do I still have the freedom to disobey this 
authority? The problem discussed arises only if we assume that there is 
something like ‘the morally good’ and that this morally good should direct 
our actions, in other words, that the good has moral authority. Only then a 
problem of obedience arises: Do I have the choice to disobey the moral 
authority of the good? Is there a ground for such disobedience? If we have 
a free will, does that include the freedom to disobey in this sense? Plato’s 
position can be rephrased as the view that this disobedience is not 
possible. Augustine’s position can be put as the claim that God having 
moral authority, or God having given the good to us which has moral 
authority, does not exclude our freedom to disobey, to turn away from 
God and good, and to choose evil. The problem with the latter position is, 
as I argued, that if I really know God and good, and recognize them as 
having moral authority, there seems to be no ground for choosing evil.  
 
4. A fundamental tension in Kant’s theory of freedom 
 
There is a tension between two positions in Kant in regard to the 
problem of the ground for choosing evil. 
The first is that there is no ground for choosing evil. In the 
Groundwork, Kant writes that the categorical imperative10 is the supreme 
principle, that what he calls ‘ordinary human reason’ does always have it 
before its eyes and uses it as a norm of judgment, a “compass” to 
distinguish good and evil.11 On this view, then, there is no ground for 
choosing evil. If I have this compass, I know what good is, so why should 
I choose evil? The problem with this view is that we may still not act 
accordingly, we may still do evil. In the Groundwork Kant sees this as a 
343 
Mark Coeckelbergh 
 
 
problem of a tension between inclination and duty. But do we have a 
ground to follow our inclinations?  
The second position is that there is a real choice. That is, at least, 
my interpretation of Kant’s distinction between Wille and Willkür, as we 
find this in the Religion. Briefly said, Wille makes the norm (this is 
autonomy) and Willkür chooses in the light of this norm. This distinction, 
therefore, leaves room for choosing evil. Choosing evil can be seen as a 
failure of Willkür to ‘do its job’, or a failure of the person to let Willkür 
perform its proper function. To conclude, by introducing these concepts 
Kant seems to be able to account for the fact that a (rational and even 
autonomous) person may still choose to do evil. However, the question 
then is on what grounds a person can make that choice. And is this view 
not in contradiction with the position Kant takes in the Groundwork? 
To solve this tension we could go for the first position, and 
disregard the Wille-Willkür distinction to avoid a contradiction with the 
first position. If we look at Kant’s view of autonomy in the Groundwork, 
we see that he defines autonomy in terms of determination, in the sense 
that I determine the law and the law determines me. This is independence 
in the sense that I determine the law, but not independence to choose 
between good and evil. Kant equates the principle of autonomy with the 
categorical imperative, which means that the rule “Never to choose except 
in such a way that in the same volition the maxims of your choice are also 
present as universal law’ is “an imperative - that is, that the will of every 
rational being is necessarily bound to the rule as a condition.”12 However, 
this could be interpreted as meaning that our will is only bound to the 
categorical imperative in so far as we’re rational beings. So although we 
may have the capacity to let ourselves be determined by the law, we may 
not exercise this capacity. But on what grounds can I decide to do that? 
The problem of choosing evil remains unsolved. 
Another way of trying to solve the tension is to go for the second 
position. Let us look again at the Wille-Willkür distinction. Bernstein 
suggests that Kant decided to introduce this distinction to account for the 
basic presupposition in Kant’s moral theory that “we are agents who have 
the capacity to choose freely to obey or disobey what is dictated by the 
moral law.”13 According to Bernstein, Kant views moral agents as being 
“radically free - that is, to be an agent who can choose good or evil 
maxims.”14 However, as I indicated earlier, this view is problematic since 
it is not clear on what basis we, or Willkür, can make a choice between 
good and evil. I argue now that Kant’s discussion of radical evil, in the 
Religion, is an attempt to deal with this problem.  
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5. Kant’s account of radical evil 
 
What is radical evil? Let us first see what Kant means by ‘evil’, 
or an ‘evil’ maxim. Evil lies not in following your inclinations. Following 
your natural inclinations is “not a matter of reproach.”15 We may adopt 
natural inclinations as an incentive in our maxim, as long as this incentive 
is not primary. The issue is not which incentives a maxim contains, but 
“how these incentives are ordered.”16 in particular whether or not duty or 
respect for the law is a primary incentive. If it’s not, the agent’s maxim 
(and consequently the agent’s behavior) is evil. 
What does Kant mean with radical evil? It means neither 
‘extreme evil’, nor is it related to having a ‘diabolical will’. Rather, Kant 
speaks of a ‘propensity’ (Hang) to evil. What is this? I choose to clarify 
this briefly on the basis of Bernstein’s analysis in his book Radical Evil.17 
We can distinguish the following three Kantian concepts: pre-disposition 
(Anlage), disposition (Gesinnung), and propensity (Hang). First, according 
to Kant we have a pre-disposition to good. Second, although we have this 
predisposition, “it is only by exercising our free will (Willkür) that we 
actually become morally good (or evil).”18 We are not born morally good, 
but we become good if we incorporate the moral law in our maxim as the 
primary incentive. However, there is no such thing as ‘being good’ if this 
is to mean that we have a fixed and unchangeable disposition. We are 
always free to choose otherwise, or so it seems. Bernstein interprets Kant’s 
view that a disposition is not acquired in time as meaning that “it is not 
causally determined but, rather, issues from our freedom.”19 Thus, with 
‘radical evil’ Kant does not mean that we are evil by nature, if this is to 
taken to mean that we are bound to do evil; on the contrary, the concept 
refers to (the ground for, or the source of) our capacity to choose freely. 
Wood comments: 
Radical evil is not to be sought in man’s predispositions, in the 
moral capacities of man as a finite rational being, but must, if it exists at 
all, be found in man’s use of his capacities through his power of free 
choice, his Willkür. It is only in a very special sense, then, that we may 
call man good or evil “by nature.”20
Kant’s concept of radical evil and his claim that we have 
propensity to evil, then, has to be interpreted as a way of accounting for 
the capacity and the possibility to choose otherwise, including evil. First, 
although we all have a predisposition to good we can always choose evil. 
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Radical evil is the property of the human will which makes it possible “to 
prefer the incentives of inclination to those of duty, and hence to do 
evil.”21 Second, although we may ‘be’ good, that is, in Kantian terms, have 
a disposition to good, we can always choose (to become) evil. To be evil is 
defined as an ‘in spite of’: “To say that a man is evil is to say that, having 
the capacity to be good, he is nonetheless evil”22. Kant’s concept of radical 
evil accounts for both possibilities, since in both cases we do not follow 
our predisposition to good. But does it really account for it? It does not 
explain why we do not follow our predisposition. Bernstein claims that it 
doesn’t do any conceptual work: “it simply reiterates the fact that human 
beings who are conscious of the moral law sometimes (freely) deviate 
from it” and it “does not have any exploratory force (practical or 
theoretical at all!.”23 It turns out to be another name for the problem. But 
this, by itself, is an important conclusion: Kant’s insists on the freedom of 
human beings to choose between good and evil, but is not able to account 
for a ground which justifies a choice for evil.  
Note, however, that Kant is able to account for a choice for good. 
Therefore, Bernstein is mistaken when he concludes that “to ask why we 
freely choose to adopt good or evil maxims is to ask an impossible 
question” since “ultimately, it is ‘inscrutable’ to us.”24 Kant is able to 
show why we are able to freely choose good. In interpreting Kant’s 
account of radical evil in terms of radical freedom, Bernstein downplays 
the first pole of the tension I identified earlier. According to Kant, human 
beings - if they really are persons, if they are human - cannot but 
recognize the authority of the moral law. This is precisely why Kant 
categorically rejects the possibility of man as a devilish being, a being 
with a diabolical will. So although people may be free to choose evil, 
having a propensity to evil, they are neither innately diabolical, since they 
are predisposed to good, nor free to become diabolical. Concerning the 
later, I disagree with Bernstein, who argues that, on Kant’s analysis of 
Willkür, “we can choose to be perverse, we can choose to be devilish, we 
can choose to defy the moral law.”25 The problem with that choice remains 
that Kant cannot account for a ground, whereas for doing good, he offers 
(the recognition of) the existence of the moral law. Certainly, it is 
questionable whether Kant is right about the existence of such a ground. 
But at least he can account for the possibility of choosing good within his 
own framework. If we only look at Kant’s concept of Willkür, we can 
understand Bernstein’s interpretation of radical evil in terms of radical 
freedom. But this is only one side of the coin. Bernstein is right to say that 
Kant never compromises the “cardinal principle” that “human beings are 
morally accountable and responsible,”26 but this principle is not only 
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related to the view that it is always within our power to choose between 
good and evil maxims. We may disobey the moral law, but this law 
remains the moral authority on which we are dependent as rational agents. 
Precisely because of this, we must bear complete moral responsibility for 
our choice, we are accountable. Therefore, Kant’s fundamental insight in 
morality is not only that he acknowledged “a profound moral truth about 
our radical free choice (Willkür)”; he also stresses that the will, through 
the faculty of Wille, taken as a specific aspect of the will next to Willkür, is 
bound to acknowledge the moral law. Therefore, if we act against the 
moral law, we betray (the volitional and rational aspect of) our very being. 
As Wood argues in support of Kant: “If man is to be conceived as a 
morally accountable being at all, it must be presupposed that he 
understands the moral imperative as binding on him, and consequently 
recognizes this imperative as an incentive to action.”27 Furthermore, the 
choice to be devilish, that is, to freely and consistently choose to defy the 
moral law, is on this view not possible, or, at least, entirely groundless.  
What is the argument in support of these last points made? Part of 
the source of Kant’s trouble is his conception of agency. Allison rightly 
points to Kant’s distinction between willing and wishing, giving the 
following example: 
Thus, I can perfectly well really desire to be healthy and at the 
same time also really desire to eat fattening foods, drink to excess and 
lounge about rather than exercise. There is no inconsistency in this all, nor 
is there any sense to claim that I ought not to wish for or desire a scenario 
in which I could become healthy while still maintaining these habits. What 
I cannot do is will to be healthy, or, more properly, will to attempt to 
become healthy, while also refusing to change my behavior.28
I infer from this that, according to Kant, although we may wish to 
make an inclination our primary incentive, we cannot will this, we cannot 
will evil, we can only will good. But then it is difficult to see why it is 
possible that we choose evil, since the faculty of free choice is a volitional 
faculty, a faculty of the will. On the basis of this distinction, we cannot 
choose to do evil; we can only wish to do evil. Therefore, according to 
Kant, if we act against the moral law, “we do not actually will that our 
immoral maxim should become a universal law, but merely take the 
liberty of making an exception to it of ourselves.”29 We cannot reject the 
law; this would be incompatible with our predisposition to good. We only 
want an exception for ourselves. This is evil, and this is at the same time 
the reason why the possibility of a diabolical will is precluded, since then 
we would explicitly deny the authority of the law. And the reason why it is 
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not possible, according to Kant, to deny the authority of the law, lies in his 
conception of (free) agency. If, for a free will, the moral law provides “the 
ultimate norm in terms of which its choices must be justified,” then “a free 
rational agent cannot reject the authority of the law without undermining 
its own agency.”30  
But even if a diabolical will is precluded by Kant, he does not 
preclude the possibility of choosing and doing evil, and the problem 
remains on which grounds I can will and choose to take the liberty to 
make an exception to the moral law for myself. It may be true that “in 
order to be accountable and, therefore to be either good or evil, it is 
necessary to recognize the validity of the moral law,”31 but if I really 
recognize and respect it, what is the ground for contravening it? How 
could I ever will to do so? 
To conclude, Kant stresses the freedom of the will, which creates 
the problem that it is unclear to account for choosing evil; but he also 
maintains that the will is bound to acknowledge the moral, a view that 
suffers from his insistence on freedom of the will (to choose evil). The 
tension between these two aspects remains, so deeply embodied and 
entrenched in his account of radical evil, cannot simply be dissolved in 
favor of the ‘freedom’ aspect.  
Note that this tension is in fact already embodied in Kant’s 
concept of freedom itself. On the one hand, Kant maintains that a free 
being determines itself spontaneously; on the other hand, this self-
determination or autonomy is held to only make sense in relation to a 
moral principle which provides the norm for justifying choice. “A free act 
requires a subjective principle or maxim in accordance with which an 
agent determines himself, just as the concept of freedom generally requires 
a moral law governing it in order to be a coherent concept at all.”32  
 
6. The problem of radical evil as a problem of freedom 
 
Is Kant’s problem our problem, and if so, why? It certainly is our 
problem if we want to extend the meaning of freedom to the freedom to 
choose evil. The problem discussed in this paper can be summarized as 
resulting from a tension between two wishes, or ideals. The first is the 
(modern?) desire to be free. If this freedom is understood as including the 
freedom to choose between good and evil, however, the ideal of freedom 
clashes with the ideal of moral excellence, being good, and many of us 
would like to include in this ideal some notion of authority. We want to 
say that morality has authority, that we ought to choose good. However, 
the problem with this view is that it tends to make the notion of freedom of 
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choice redundant, since there is no real choice anymore, real choice 
meaning grounded choice. What is the ground for doing evil, if we know 
the good and its authority?  
Kant’s discussion of radical evil can be understood from this 
perspective, and from the perspective of the problem with his Wille-
Willkür view (and the tension with this view in the Groundwork) discussed 
above. 
In an attempt to hold on to the ideal of freedom ‘at all costs’, 
Kant felt compelled to explain why we would still want to choose evil by 
saying in the Religion that there is “a radical innate evil in human 
nature,”33 more, that “man is evil by nature.”34 But what does this mean? 
Kant was faced with the difficulty to explain evil without destroying the 
spontaneity of the will. ‘By nature’ could not mean that man is determined 
to do evil. Otherwise a contradiction arises, which only could be avoided 
by destroying the freedom of the will, assigning a cause of evil other than 
the will itself, or give up the idea of the unity of the will.35 But this Kant is 
not prepared to do. Therefore, he ended up grounding evil in the freedom 
of the will itself. This is the radical evil in our nature. The problem with 
this answer, however, is that at the same time Kant believed that our 
original predisposition “is a predisposition to good.”36 This leaves him 
with the difficulty to explain why, if we have predisposition to good, we 
have a ground to choose evil. To assume, as Kant does, that there is 
‘radical evil’, is therefore, it seems, not more than a reformulation of the 
problem. To say that there is a ground for choosing evil is, by itself, not an 
argument but an assumption. Moreover, even if we accept this assumption, 
it does not explain why we sometimes choose good, sometimes evil.  
Kant admitted his failure to account for the ground of (choosing) 
evil. But it would be wrong to call the problem of the origin of evil as it is 
discussed by Kant “a mystery.”37 I hope to have shown that the tension in 
his view, the ‘war with himself’ (to use Bernstein’s words), is in fact very 
understandable and explainable if we look at the assumptions that feed the 
tension, the trenches that mark the battle landscape. Kant fiercely holds on 
to his positions, and this means that the arguments in this framework move 
between discernable lines that can be made explicit. It may be, of course, 
that we can’t solve the problem of the origin of evil. But we can make 
clear our assumptions about freedom and agency that cause us in the 
trouble we’re in, assumptions that are at the same time related to some of 
our finest human ideals and widely respected metaphysical views. 
Kant and Augustine could have adopted a fully dualistic view, as 
the Manicheans did. In that case, both good and evil have authority, and 
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present us with a law. The struggle between good and evil in the person 
would then be a reflection or incarnation of a cosmic struggle between two 
forces, light and darkness, good and evil. But precisely because Kant and 
Augustine did refuse this route, rejecting dualism and not wanting to deny 
human freedom, the problem of choosing evil emerged. It is only if we 
belief that the Good has the only and full moral authority over our choices 
and actions, that the problem ‘Is there a ground for choosing evil?’ 
emerges. Only because Kant gives the categorical imperative the nature of 
an imperative, giving this rule an imperial authority, that is, the full and 
total authority, the question of disobedience emerges. By assuming radical 
evil in human nature, it seems, at first sight, that Kant turns to a dualistic 
view to account for this disobedience. But his belief in the self-
determining power of the rational person, who rules himself and at the 
same time obeys the law, is to great to take his own claim that “man is evil 
by nature”38 if it is to mean that there is something constitutive in our 
nature that draws us to evil in a deterministic way. Rather, Kant’s claim 
“man is evil by nature” can only mean that it is possible to choose evil, but 
that we are free not to make use of this possibility. But is it really possible 
to choose evil, and on what grounds? The problem remains. Kant’s view 
of autonomy shows the tension between freedom (to choose evil) and 
obedience (to the moral law), but fails as an attempt to resolve this tension. 
Perhaps this is the price we have to pay: (1) if we want to keep the 
heritage of Plato, that is, in this context, hold on to an idea of the Good 
that sees evil not as ‘the Evil’, as a separate principle having equal force 
and authoritative status, but as the not-Good, the not-one, the manyness 
and imperfection of the world of appearance as compared with the oneness 
and perfection of the idea of the Good; or (2) if we want to retain the very 
idea of freedom involved in this discussion, that is, is the idea that we 
cannot blame our struggle to ‘outer’ forces, but that we ourselves are 
responsible for turning towards or turning away from the Good. 
It is important to realize the significance of the ‘prize’ I 
mentioned. The cost of holding on to these assumptions is not just the 
failure to resolve the tension related to the problem of evil in Kant’s 
account of morality. This is not just a problem of evil, or a problem with 
Kant. Ultimately, this failure bounces back to the credibility of our 
assumptions and the coherence of our beliefs and ideals, including our 
view of agency, morality, freedom, and autonomy (in so far as these views 
echo the aspects of Plato’s, Augustine’s, and Kant’s views I discussed in 
this paper). For example, concerning a widely held view of freedom, 
namely the view that we are free to reject the moral law, Seigfried 
remarks: “If Kant’s explanation of the freedom of the will could not 
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account for evil, it could not even ultimately account for human freedom, 
since [...] the possibility of both good and evil has to be accounted for if it 
is to be maintained that the will is really free.”39 Our beliefs may be or 
may not be the right ones to have, but if we want to hold on to them surely 
much more work is to be done to make sense of them given the 
philosophical problems discussed in this paper. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In my paper I have not solved the problem of choosing evil, but I 
have shown why it cannot be solved easily or without serious costs. 
First, it cannot be solved by choosing either Plato’s or 
Augustine’s view, since both remain problematic for different reasons. 
The former since it denies our wish to be free to turn away from the Good, 
the second since it can’t provide a ground for doing so.  
Second, it cannot be solved by a moral theory that embodies the 
tension between the two positions without successfully resolving this 
tension, as my analysis of Kant shows. 
Third, it may be resolved by embracing a Manichean dualism 
with regard to good and evil, but this can only be done at the cost of 
rejecting an important aspect that lies at the root of much thinking in our 
tradition, namely the idea that there is no such thing as evil with a 
capitalized E, that the Good as oneness is more original and (therefore) 
authoritative with regard to moral choice, and, furthermore, that we 
ourselves are responsible if we turn away from it in spite of our knowing 
the Good. It remains unclear whether such a turn is possible at all, at least 
under the description ‘choosing evil’. 
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Educational Publishing, 1964), II/48 
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10 I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (London: Hutchinson, 
1948), 402 
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13 Bernstein, Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2002), 14 
14 Ibid, 14 
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20 A. Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion  (Ithaca/London: Cornell University 
Press, 1970), 214 
21 Ibid, 216 
22 Ibid, 219 
23 Bernstein, 33 
24 Ibid, 35 
25 Ibid, 42 
26 Ibid, 43 
27 Wood, 211-212 
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36 Kant, Religion, 38 
37 Seigfried, 610 
38 Kant, Religion, 27 
39 Seigfried, 612  
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Allison, H.E. Idealism and freedom: Essays on Kant’s theoretical and 
practica Philosophy.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996. 
Allison, H.E. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990. 
Augustine. Confessions. (trans. R.S. Pine-Coffin) London: Penguin Books, 
1961. 
Augustine. On Free Choice of the Will. (trans. Anna S. Benjamin and L.H. 
Hackstaff) Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 
1964. 
Bernstein, Richard J. Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002. 
Bernstein, Richard J. "Radical Evil: Kant at War with Himself," in 
Rethinking Evil, ed. Maria Pia Lara (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2001). 
Coeckelbergh, M. The Metaphysics of Autonomy: The Reconciliation of 
Ancient and Modern. Ph.D. thesis, University of Birmingham, 
2003. 
Feinberg, J. The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (Vol.III): Harm to Self. 
New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
Kant, I. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (trans. H.J. Paton). 
London: Hutchinson, 1948 (original 1785). 
Kant, I  Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (trans. T.M. Greene 
and H.H. Hudson). New York: Harper & Row, 1960 (original 
1793). 
 
353 
Mark Coeckelbergh 
 
 
 
Kant, I. The Metaphysics of Morals (trans. M. Gregor). Cambridge: C.U.P, 
1797. 
Plato. Phaedrus in The Dialogues of Plato (Vol.III), ed. and trans. B. 
Jowett (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1953). Plato. Republic in 
The Dialogues of Plato (Vol.II), ed. and trans. B. Jowett (Oxford: 
The Clarendon Press, 1953). 
Seigfried, C.H. "The Radical Evil in Human Nature" in: Akten des 4. 
Internationalen Kant-Kongresses Mainz 6.-10. April 1974 (Teil 
II.2.), ed. G. Funke (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1974). 
Wood, Allen W. Kant’s Moral Religion. Ithaca/London: Cornell, 
University Press, 1970. 
  
